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ARGUMENT
I.

ONE-WAY TELEPHONE PAGING HAS LONG BEEN REGULATED UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AND ANY DEREGULATION THEREOF MUST BE IN STRICT ACCORDANCE
WITH THE APPLICABLE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS.
A.

The Commission
has Interpreted its
Jurisdictional
Authority
to Include
One-Way Paging Services.

A critical difference of opinion exists between the
parties to this appeal with respect to how the Utah Public Service Commission's

("Commission") regulation of the one-way tele-

phone paging industry for over twenty years should be characterized.

The Commission and American Paging, Inc. of Utah ("Ameri-

can Paging") argue that the Commission never had jurisdiction,
and thus, whatever it was the Commission did for twenty years
could not be regulation.
that the Commission

They argue that it was only in 1983

first took any action which construed its

jurisdiction over one-way paging.

They refer, of course, to the

letter issued on June 3, 1983 by the Commission to American Paging denying jurisdiction over one-way paging.

That letter was

the subject of the appeal in Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986), the predecessor case to the present action.
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Both

the Commission and American

Paging

attempt to

characterize the Commission's long history of granting and denying certificates for paging services, extracting utility taxes,
requiring publication and filing of tariffs and generally placing
on providers of one-way paging services the regulatory burdens to
which

utilities

are

subject,

as

simply

fallout

Commission's inadvertence or "unwitting regulation".

from

the

The Com-

mission and American Paging seek to persuade this Court to ignore
the Commission's

long-standing

practice of regulating one-way

paging with statements such as the following:
The Commission cannot acquire such authority
merely by passage of time or by unauthorized
issuance of certificates.
Brief of Commission at p.6 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the PSCU's accession to requests
for certificates of authority to operate
one-way paging services was mostly incidental. The facts reflect that the PSCU's mere
consent to grant certain requests for certificates of authority to operate one-way
services was only sporadic, and was actually
an unwitting violation of statutory authority.
Brief of American Paging at pp. 9-10 (emphasis added).
Respondents emphasize that the Commission never issued
a formal order specifically declaring its jurisdiction over paging services.

That implies necessarily that respondents are of

the opinion that twenty years of active and vigorous regulation

-2-

should simply be ignored rather than viewed as an exercise of
jurisdiction and an interpretation of the governing statutes.
This Court previously rejected that argument in Williams v, Public Service Commission, supra, as being without merit.

720 P.2d

at 776.
American

Paging

seriously

misconstrues

this Court's

opinion in Williams by implying in its "Statement of Facts" that
the Court made the following factual finding:
The prior unwitting grant of authority did not constitute an interpretation of jurisdiction, but rather, was
simply an assent to requests for certificates of convenience and necessity.
American Paging brief at p. 2.
Court made no such finding.
held:

Petitioner submits that this

In fact, in Williams, this Court

"For over twenty years, the Commission has interpreted its

authority over telephone corporations to include one-way paging
services."

720 P. 2d at 776.

Moreover, this Court declared that

the Commission cannot reverse its long-settled position regarding
the

scope

appropriate

of

its

jurisdiction

procedural

without

requirements.

complying
Id.

at

with

777.

the
Those

requirements were not satisfied in Williams and they are not
satisfied in this case.
It is almost incomprehensible that respondents actually
maintain that the Commission never exercised jurisdiction over
one-way paging services so as to bring that industry within the
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scope of regulated utilities.

Had that been the case, surely the

Court in Williams would have ended the dispute with a decisive
ruling to that effect.

Instead, the Court found that the Com-

mission improperly attempted

to "deregulate" a long regulated

service. Jjd. at 776-77.
It is somewhat ironic that at the same time respondents
are arguing that the Commission's "unwitting" regulation should
be ignored, they are also arguing that it is the Commission's
expertise and experience

that should be given deference when

examining the "rule making" procedure challenged by Williams.

In

other words, when it serves their purpose, respondents readily
denounce the Commission's actions as being "unwitting," "incidental," or "in violation of statutory authority," but are quick
to hear Id the Commission as the body empowered and equipped to
address

the

jurisdictional

issue

achieved—namely, deregulation.

when

the

desired

goal

is

Petitioner maintains that if

deference is to be given to the Commission's actions and rulings,
it must apply equally to a twenty year history of consistant
regulation and the policy consequences which follow.
Petitioner Williams maintains that this case must be
evaluated and decided based on the premise that the Commission
previously interpreted its jurisdiction to include one-way paging
services.

Accepting that premise, respondents' arguments con-

cerning the various positions taken in other jurisdictions with
respect to the issue of whether paging services are utilities
-4-

subject to regulation are rendered moot —
having already been made in Utah.

that determination

Likewise, concerns about the

broad, over-reaching impact of such an interpretation on other
aspects of

the

telecommunication

industry, such as answering

machines, telephone directories, etc., are unfounded since the
Commission's exercise of jurisdiction extended only to paging
services.

Petitioner has never argued

that the Commission's

actions require expansion of jurisdiction over activities it has
not previously
B.

regulated.
In Order for the Commission to Deregulate One-Way Paging the Applicable
Procedural and Substantive Requirements
must be Satisfied.

In Williams, this Court stated:
Petioners allege, inter alia, that the Commission did not follow proper administrative
procedures in concluding that it lacked
jurisdiction. We agree that the Commission
failed to adhere to proper requirements in
ruling on the jurisdictional issue, and
accordingly reverse and remand for a new
hearing that comports with the applicable
statutes.
720 P. 2d at 773-74 (emphasis added).

At the time Williams was

argued and decided, the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act and
the Public
statutes.

Utilities Act appeared

to be

the most

pertinent

The Court conclude that the Administrative Rule Making

Act was the most applicable, held that its requirements had not

-5-

been

satisfied

and

speculated

that on

remand

a

rule making

proceeding would be followed by the Commission.
During the appeal process in Williams but before the
adoption of Rule 8304 by the Commission, the Legislature enacted
the Public Telecommunications Act, Utah Code Ann. § 54~8b-l et
seq. (Supp. 1985) clarifying the Commission's authority to regulate telecommunication services and providing a specific procedure for the deregulation or exemption of services which had
previously been regulated.

Petitioner Williams does not seek (as

suggested by respondents in their briefs) to slide paging services within the ambit of regulation by requesting this Court to
enlarge

the Commission's

jurisdiction

pursuant

to § 54-8b-2.

Rather, accepting the premise advocated by petitioner that paging
was already a regulated service, Chapter 8b comes into play only
to

the

extent

exempting

it

provides

a regulated

a

procedure

service.

for

deregulating

or

Petitioner does not seek an

expansion of jurisdiction to include paging, but rather recognition of prior regulation and adherence to applicable statutory
requirements in attempts to deregulate.
Perhaps

"unwittingly,"

the

Commission

and

American

Paging conceed the applicability of Chapter 54-8b to the present
case.

At page 33 of its brief, American Paging states:
Third, the explicit purpose of Chapter 54-8b
is to deregulate telecommunications services
over which the PSCU now has statutory jurisdiction and which exist in a competitive
environment.
-6-

The Commission states at page 9 of its brief that the purpose of
the Act is to:
provide a method for exempting any telecommunication service from regulation over which
the Commission had jurisdiction under prior
existing law.
The Commission and American Paging both admit that the
exemption or deregulation procedure provided for in Utah Code
Ann. S 54-8b-3 was not followed in the present case even though
it was in full force and effect at the time Rule 8304 was adopted.

American Paging at page 7 of its brief states:

"The PSCU

did not engage in exemption proceedings under Chapter 8b of the
Telecommunications Act."

The only reason advanced by respondents

for not applying the Act is their erroneous argument that the
Commission has never regulated paging services.

Failure to com-

ply with that procedure requires that Rule 8304 be found void and
of no effect and that the American Paging order be reversed.
II.

PETITIONER DOES NOT DISPUTE THE POSSIBILITY OF
DEREGULATION BUT MAINTAINS THAT ADMINISTRATIVE
FIAT IS AN UNACCEPTABLE METHOD OF ACCOMPLISHING
DEREGULATION.
The

Williams'

Commission

arguments

and

American

regarding

estoppel

long-standing policy interpretations.

Paging
and

misconstrue

abandonment

of

They attempt to distin-

guish Husky Oil Co. v. State Tax Commission, 556 P.2d 1268 (Utah

-7-

1976) and Celebrity Cluby Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission,
602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979) by arguing that since those decisions do
not

involve

determinations

of

jurisdiction,

inapplicable to the facts of the present case.

they

are wholly

To the contrary,

it is the broader principles advanced by those decisions that are
compelling in this case.

Husky Oil stands for the proposition

that "radical departures from administrative interpretation consistently followed cannot be made except for the most cogent
reasons."

556 P.2d at 1271 (emphasis added).

Never, not even in

the Commission's adoption of Rule 8304, have any reasons, let
alone cogent reasons, been given for reversal of the Commission's
long-standing practice of regulating paging services.

The Com-

mission cannot articulate any cogent reasons for reversing its
position because it refuses to even acknowledge that it ever had
jurisdiction.

Even if the correct procedural steps are followed,

they must result in findings which satisfy the cogency requirement of Husky Oil before the Commission can reverse its position.
Celebrity Club, on the other hand, is cited by Williams
for the proposition that once an administrative agency acts or
speaks so as to invoke reliance on those actions by some other
party which results in injury to that party, the agency may be
estopped from denying or altering those prior acts or statements.
Here, the Commission is estopped from denying its jurisdiction
over one-way paging.

If, through appropriate procedures (com-

pliance with the Public Telecommunications Act), deregulation is
-8-

deemed appropriate for one-way paging based on specific findings
and reasons which are cogent, then the Commission might be able
to overcome the estoppel argument.

However, the Commission is

clearly estopped from denying its prior exercise of jurisdiction
for the purpose of adopting a rule rejecting jurisdiction based
solely on that denial.
the Commission

must

If paging services are to be deregulated,
acknowledge

the regulated

industry and deal with it accordingly.

status

of the

It cannot simply pretend

it never had jurisdiction.
III. THE RULE-MAKING PROCEEDING FAILED
CRITICAL NOTICE REQUIREMENTS.

TO

SATISFY

When Chairman Cameron gave notice of the rule-making
proceeding in the separate and ancillary one-way paging hearing,
the only certificated one-way paging carriers present were David
R. Williams and Mobile Telephone Company, who were present at the
hearing through their respective attorneys.

Not present or par-

ties to those proceedings were the other two certificated one-way
paging carriers.

One of those was Royce Electronics to which

reference is made in the Commission's brief.
Telephone of Southern Utah, Inc.

The other is Mobile

Although the Commission has

attempted, post-hearing, and as part of its brief to render this
failure to comply with the notice requirement as harmless error
by ex parte contact with Mr. Royce Henningson and the preparation
and submission of his affidavit, it ignored completely, even at
this late date, the fourth certificated carrier, Mobile Telephone
-9-

of Southern Utah, Inc.

See Williams, 720 P.2d at 775.

In view

of the Commission's diligence in seeking out Royce Henningson, we
assume that its failure to supply a similar affidavit from Mobile
Telephone of Southern Utah, Inc. is due to its inability to
obtain such an affidavit.
IV.

EVEN IF THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULE-MAKING
PROCEDURE HAD BEEN COMPLIED WITH RULE NO. 8 3 04
WOULD STILL BE VOID AS UNSUPPORTED BY ANY FINDINGS
OR COGENT REASONS.
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court is somehow able to

overlook the inadequate notice given in the rule-making proceeding, Rule No. 8304 is still void as a matter of law because it is
not based on any findings or reasons which satisfy the cogency
requirement of Husky Oil.

Furthermore, the enactment of the

Public Telecommunications Act cannot simply be ignored.

The

specific provisions of Utah Code Ann. S 54-8b-3(2) require that
the Commission, before exempting any telecommunication service
from regulation, hold a hearing, make specific findings and issue
an order stating the terms and ocnditions for the exemption.
Notwithstanding objections filed by petitioner, the Commission
failed to satisfy those requirements in its purported rule-making
proceeding.

Rule No. 8304 is, therefore, void as a matter of

law.
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CONCLUSION
For
Williams*
vacated

the reasons

opening

and

set

forth

brief, Commission

the Commission's

in Petitioner

Rule No. 8304

should be

order of dismissal in Case No.

85-2007-01 should be reversed.
Respectfully

above and

/

submitted

this $Lf —' day

of

November,

1986.
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